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The Truth will prevail, but only if we demand it from Congress! 9-11 Inside Job and Neocons Hacked 2004 SCROLL DOWN
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IRAQ ARTICLE 2
Scott Ritter | Not Everyone Got it Wrong on Iraqi WMDs Not Everyone Got It Wrong on Iraqi WMDs By Scott Ritter Thursday 05 February 2004 "We were all wrong," David Kay, the Bush administration's sleuth in there were probably no weapons of mass destruction in contradicting President Bush's pre-war claims Despite the deaths of more than 525 American service members in David Kay insisted that the blame for the failure weapons lies not with the president and his administration -- which had relentlessly pushed for war -- but rather with the community, which had, according The Kay remarks appear data in a way that is Bush's decision intelligence failure reinforces this suspicion, since such a commission would only be given the mandate policies and decision-making processes that made use of that data. More disturbing, the proposed commission's findings would be delayed until late fall, after the November 2004 presidential election. The fact is, regardless of the findings of any commission, not everyone was wrong. I, for one, wasn't, having done my level best demand facts from the Bush administration allegations regarding that, speaking out and writing in as many forums as possible the public in the danger of war based upon a hyped-up threat. In this I was not alone. Rolf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the U.N. weapons inspec direction, Blix, who headed U.N. weapons inspections in invasion started in March 2003 stated that his inspec evidence of either WMD or WMD-related programs in familiar with intelligence analyst Greg Theilmann, exposed the unsubstantiated nature of the Bush administration's claims regarding There was an answer was no need --consisting as it does of layer upon layer of deceit and obfuscation -- there were enough basic elements of truth and substantive fact about the final disposition of Saddam Hussein's secret weapons programs the answer. Sadly, however, it seems that those assigned the task of solving the riddle had no predisposition Moreover, President Bush's decision in critique of his administration's use (or abuse) of such intelligence. Remember, his administration was talking of war with before the direc Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the defining document on a particular area of the world or specified threat. According on of which was obtained by the "President Bush approved the overall war strategy for year." The specific date cited was Aug. 29, 2002, when Bush approved the goals, objectives and strategy for first bomb was dropped and six months before he asked the U.N. Security Council for a war mandate that he never received," the noted. The CIA did eventually produce an NIE for 2002, after the president had already decided on war. The very title of the NIE, " reflective of a predisposition of analysis that was not backed up by either the facts available at the time or the passage of time. Stu Cohen, a 28-year veteran of the CIA, wrote in a statement published on the CIA Web site on Nov. 28, 2003, that the CIA's Oc 2002 National Intelligence Estimate "judged with high confidence that had chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles in excess of the 150-kilometer limit imposed by the U.N. Security Council ... these ... judgments were essentially the same conclusions reached by the United Nations and a wide array of intelligence services -- friendly and unfriendly alike." Stu Cohen noted that the Oc meaning that it did not propose a policy that mitigated for or against going had been pressured by the White House NIE. But Cohen is fundamentally wrong in his assertions. The fact that a major policy decision like war with an NIE is, in and of itself, policy manipulation. Judgments -- even those as poor as the ones reflected in the a critical NIE is likewise manipulation. I worked with Cohen on numerous occasions during that time frame and consider him a reasonable man. So I had professional, confronted with the accurately assess the threat posed by "convinced that no reasonable person could have viewed the information that the Intelligence Community had at its disposal -- literally millions of pages -- and reached any conclusions or alternative views that were profoundly different from those that we reached." I consider myself intelligence professionals who prepared the Oc intimately familiar with vast quantities of intelligence data, collected from around the world by numerous foreign intelligence services (including the CIA), and on the ground in up until the time of my resignation from UNSCOM in August 1998. Based on this experience, I was asked by Arms Control Today, the respected journal of the Arms Control Association, disarmament regarding That article, "The Case for published in June 2000 and received wide media coverage. The intelligence communities of the conclusions. But my finding that "because of the work carried out by UNSCOM, it can be fairly stated that the time inspec assessment of the disarmament of than the CIA's 2002 NIE or any corresponding analysis carried out by British intelligence services. I am not alone in my analytical differences. Ray McGovern, who heads the nonprofit Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, or VIPS, also takes umbrage at Cohen's "no reasonable person" assertion. "Had Cohen taken the trouble over the past two years," McGovern said recently, he would have seen that "our writings consistently contained conclusions and alternative views that were indeed profoundly different -- even without having had access what Stu calls the ' he thought us not 'reasonable' -- at least back when many of us worked with him at CIA." The fact is, Ray McGovern and I, and the scores of intelligence professionals, retired or still in service, who studied capabilities, are reasonable men. We got it right. The Bush administration, in its rush factual data we used, and instead relied on rumor, speculation, exaggeration and falsification elected representatives in a quagmire. We knew the truth about Sadly, no one listened. |